Fast Handover for Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (F-HMIPv6) that combines advantages of Fast Handover for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) and Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) achieves the superior performance in terms of handover latency and signaling overhead compared with previously developed mobility protocols. However, without being secured, F-HMIPv6 is vulnerable to various security threats. In 2007, Kang and Park proposed a security scheme, which is seamlessly integrated into FHMIPv6. In this paper, we reveal that Kang-Park's scheme cannot defend against the Denial of Service (DoS) and redirect attacks while largely relying on the group key. Then, we propose an Enhanced Security Scheme for F-HMIPv6 (ESS-FH) that achieves the strong key exchange and the key independence as well as addresses the weaknesses of Kang-Park's scheme. More importantly, it enables fast handover between different MAP domains. The proposed scheme is formally verified based on BAN-logic, and its handover latency is analyzed and compared with that of Kang-Park's scheme.
Introduction
Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) is a protocol that provides mobility service for a mobile node (MN) regardless of its movements in IPv6 networks [1] . In spite of its great potential, it suffers from long handover latency and high signaling overhead. In order to address these problems, FMIPv6 [2] and HMIPv6 [3] have been proposed. While FMIPv6 improves the handover latency through link layer (L2) triggers and bi-directional tunneling between access routers (ARs), HMIPv6 optimizes the signaling overhead by adopting a local home agent (HA) called Mobility Anchor Point (MAP). These two enhancements adopt their own different approaches to improve MIPv6. It is thus natural that there is a high need to gracefully combine them together to take all their advantages. As a result, F-HMIPv6 has been developed [4] , [5] . It is well known that this enhancement successfully achieves the best performance in terms of handover latency and signaling overhead [6] .
Despite the best efficiency, without being secured, FHMIPv6 is vulnerable to various security threats such as the DoS or redirect attacks [7] , [8] . Recently, Kang proposed a security scheme to provide secure handovers for F-HMIPv6 [8] . To our best knowledge, this is the only security scheme properly harmonized with F-HMIPv6. Thus, it has played a milestone role for the security of F-HMIPv6. However, we discover that Kang-Park's scheme is still vulnerable to the DoS and redirect attacks while largely depending on the group key. Additionally, in Kang-Park's scheme, the fast handover cannot be supported when MNs move between different MAP domains. In this paper, we analyze its weaknesses, and then propose an Enhanced Security Scheme for F-HMIPv6 (ESS-FH). Based on the Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) method [9] and the public key cryptography, ESS-FH provides the strong key exchange and the key independence in addition to improving the weaknesses, from which Kang-Park's scheme suffers. Moreover, it achieves the secure fast inter-handover between different MAP domains. The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we describe Kang-Park's scheme and analyze its weaknesses. In Sect. 3, we introduce the enhanced security scheme for F-HMIPv6 by splitting three operations: initialization, intra-handover, and inter-handover phases. BANlogic based security analysis is given in Sect. 4. Then, in Sect. 5, the analytical modeling for handover latency and its numerical results are presented prior to the conclusions in Sect. 6.
Kang-Park's Security Scheme
Kang-Park's scheme is composed of two phases: MAP registration phase and handover phase. While the first phase is performed when an MN bootstraps or moves in a new MAP domain, the second one is executed when the MN moves between ARs within the MAP domain. In order to protect the MAP registration phase, Kang-Park's scheme leverages the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) infrastructure [10] , through which a MAP shares a session key with an MN as well as authenticates it. Especially, the MAP issues a ticket to the MN to safely deliver the session key to its ARs. For this goal, it is assumed that the MAP shares a group key with its ARs in advance, and all involved nodes are time-synchronized. Note that the group key is used to encrypt the session key and the encrypted key is included in the ticket. Thus, once given the ticket, each AR can extract the session key. In the handover phase, after receiving the ticket, the AR recovers and uses the session key to protect the fast handover phase.
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In spite of its seamless integration with F-HMIPv6, KangPark's scheme has the following weaknesses:
• Dependency on the group key: As mentioned above, Kang-Park's scheme depends on the group key approach to securely distribute the session key. Therefore, if the group key is revealed, this scheme becomes vulnerable to various security threats and thus can be easily attacked. Unfortunately, it is not easy to securely manage the group key because it is leaked even if only one AR is compromised. Also, the cost for recovering the key is expensive. As a result, the MAP and the related ARs are occupied while suspending their meaningful jobs.
• Redirect attack: There are two kinds of redirect attacks: session hijacking and malicious mobile node flooding [7] . Kang-Park's scheme is vulnerable to the malicious mobile node flooding attack because, in the handover phase, the MAP, unlike the nAR, cannot detect if the MN truly attaches to the new network. That makes the target network to be flooded with unwanted excess traffic.
In addition, Kang-Park's scheme does not support the fast handover when MNs move between different MAP domains, i.e., inter-handover. That makes this scheme unable to continuously guarantee the quality of service required for delay sensitive applications.
Enhanced Security Scheme for F-HMIPv6
In this section, the proposed ESS-FH is introduced. In ESS-FH, each MN negotiates a secret key Kbm with the MAP whenever moving to the MAP domain. For this Kbm negotiation, the public-key cryptography is applied in conjunction with the CGA method [9] . Based on the Kbm, ESS-FH achieves a seamless integration between the fast handover and the local binding update. Moreover, it allows the MN to continually execute the fast handover even between different MAP domains.
Notations and Preliminary
Notations used in this paper are shown in Fig. 1 .
It is assumed that each entity, i.e., MN, AR or MAP, has its own public/private key pair and its IPv6 address is a CGA, which is derived from its public key. For example, an MN has a public/private key pair PU MN /PR MN and its Regional Care-of Address (RCoA) is a CGA, which is generated from the PU MN . Also, it is supposed that there is a secure channel between a MAP and an AR. In addition, they share a Kam with each other while being time-synchronized. In this paper, we only describe the predictive mode in the fast handover [2] .
Operation
ESS-FH is composed of three phases: initialization, intrahandover, and inter-handover phases. The initialization phase is only once executed by an MN during its bootstrapping stage or during its movement from the home network. In this phase, the MN negotiates a secret key with its current MAP while performing the local binding update. After the phase, if the MN moves to a new network, the intrahandover phase or the inter-handover phase is performed depending on the type of handover.
Initialization Phase
As shown in Fig. 2 , the initialization phase is composed of the RtAdv, LBU and LBA messages. These messages are protected through the CGA method. That is, each message includes its digital signature and related CGA parameters. If an entity receives a message, it verifies the sender's public key with both the sender's address and the CGA parameters. Then, it uses the public key to validate the received digital signature.
Let us assume that each AR periodically distributes the MN . Afterwards, the MN prepares and digitally signs the LBU message, which is then sent to the MAP. Prior to forwarding this message to the MAP, the AR adds it to M0 computed on it using Kam. Through M0, the MAP can check if the MN exists in the AR's network. That makes it impossible for the malicious MN to redirect its traffic to other networks at will. When receiving the message, the MAP checks if the timestamp ts is within the current time window and M0 is valid. In order to prevent the DoS attacks, the expensive operation, e.g., the digital signature verification, is performed only in the positive case. Thus, when the two values ts and M0 are valid, the MAP verifies S IG LBU . If the signature is correct, the MAP is sure that the MN truly owns the given RCoA and PU MN . More importantly, it believes the binding between the MN's RCoA and LCoA. To reply the LBU message, the MAP prepares and digitally signs the LBA one after generating a secret key Kbm and encrypting it with PU MN . Upon receiving the LBA message, the MN verifies the signature S IG MAP , and then decrypt EKbm into Kbm. As a result of this phase, the MAP believes that the MN's RCoA is associated with the LCoA while negotiating the secret key Kbm with the MN. Also, it believes that the MN indeed exists within the AR's network. Figure 3 illustrates the intra-handover phase that is executed when the MN moves within its current MAP domain. In this phase, the key Kbm, which is negotiated during the initialization phase, is used to protect the signaling messages and distribute the secret key Kma between the MN and the new AR.
Intra-Handover Phase
When the MN detects its movement through L2 triggers, it sends the MAP the Router Solicitation for Proxy Advertisement (RtSolPr) message protected by the authenticator M1. On receiving the message, the MAP first verifies M1 with the Kbm. If M1 is valid, it generates the secret key Kma, which is then encrypted into EKma. Upon receipt of the FBU message, the MAP verifies the included M3. If M3 is valid, the MAP believes that the MN truly owns both the nLCoA and RCoA. With such a belief, it exchanges the Handover Initiate (HI) and Handover Acknowledge (HACK) messages with the nAR. During this exchange, Kma is delivered to the nAR through the HI message. As a result, the MAP starts to tunnel the traffic sent to LCoA to the nAR while returning the MN the Fast Binding Acknowledge (FBA) message. Thus, the valid FBA message convinces the MN that its data packets are being forwarded to its new location. As soon as the MN moves to the nAR's network, it announces its attachment by sending the UNA message to the nAR. If this message is correct, the nAR trusts that the MN arrives at its network, and consequently starts to deliver the buffered data packets to the MN's nLCoA. Afterwards, the MN exchanges the LBU and LBA messages with the MAP. At this point, if the nAR receives the LBU message from the MN, it computes M7 by using Kam before forwarding it to the MAP. Then, the computed value is sent to the MAP together with the message. When they arrive, the MAP uses M6 to verify the correctness of the LBU message asserting the binding between the MN's nLCoA and RCoA while using M7 to check if the MN really exists within the nAR's network. If they are all valid, the MAP stops the packet forwarding to the nAR while sending the LBA message to the MN. Note that due to M7, the malicious MN, which does not exist in the nAR's network, cannot deceive the MAP into believing that it moves at the nLCoA and making that the network suffers from the redirected traffic. 
Inter-Handover Phase
The inter-handover phase is performed when the MN moves from its current MAP domain to another. To support this phase, it is assumed that the current MAP shares Kam with the ARs, which do not belong to itself and are located at the boundary of its domain. Also, the PrRtAdv message includes a MAP option, through which the MN recognizes its movement between MAPs. When this phase starts, the MN first executes the (1)- (8) steps of the intra-handover one. Also, the MAP sends the next seq with the Kma through the HI message. That makes the MN and the nMAP continue to use seq as a fresh nonce. Once the MN configures its new RCoA after sending the UNA message, it exchanges the LBU and LBA messages with the nMAP as depicted in Fig. 4 . In order to be authenticated, the messages are digitally signed with the sender's private key in the same way as being done in the initialization phase. Especially, the LBU message is accompanied by M9, which the nAR computes to protect the nMAP against both the DoS and redirect attacks. Before computing M9, the nAR verifies the seq included in the LBU message with the one which it received from the MAP. If the M9 is valid, the nMAP can confirm that the MN really exists in the nAR's network as well as safely verify the digital signature S IG LBU without being vulnerable to the DoS attack. Additionally, to be negotiated between the two entities, the secret key Kbm is encrypted with the PU MN into EKbm, which is then conveyed in the LBA message.
Security Analysis
In this section, ESS-FH is analyzed in terms of security. For this goal, we first validate its correctness based on BANlogic [11] and then provide discussion on its security properties.
Formal Verification
For the formal verification of the proposed protocol, we apply BAN-logic which introduced by Burrows, Abadi and Needham in 1989. Because of simplicity and robustness, BAN-logic has been one of the most popular methods for analyzing security protocols. Typically, BAN-logic is composed of the following steps: (i) idealizing the original protocol, (ii) defining assumptions about the initial state and (iii) applying logical postulates repeatedly until getting the intended results. For details on notations and logical postulates of BAN-logic, refer to [11] .
In order to make verification more convenient, the extended rules E1-E3 are defined as follows:
It is clear from the meaning of the definitions that they are intuitively true. Also, let R1, R2, and R3 denote the message-meaning, nonce-verification, and jurisdiction rules, respectively.
Initialization Phase
As the first step for verification, the initialization phase is translated into the idealized version as follows:
In order to analyze this phase, we define the following assumptions:
Strictly speaking, it cannot be proved from BAN-logic that the MN and the MAP own PU MN and PU MAP , respectively. Because of this reason, A14 and A18 are presented.
With the idealized version and the assumptions, we can analyze this phase as follows:
If the MN is not time-synchronized with the AR and the MAP, it cannot say whether the RtAdv message is a replay or not because there is nothing in the message that it knows to be fresh. In other words, it just believes that the AR once sent the message. However, because the information given by the message tends to be rarely changed, we can proceed this analysis with such a belief, i.e., the formula (1) . If the time is synchronized, the MN can believe that the AR believes the RtAdv message as shown in the formula (2). On the other hand, based on the assumption A13 and the formula (3), the MAP can safely perform the asymmetric cryptographic operations while defending against the DoS attack. The formulas (3), (4) and (6) show that the MN and the MAP trust the local binding update performed during this phase. Especially, the formulas (3) and (4) make that the protocol being analyzed is not vulnerable to the redirection attacks. Due to the formula (5), in the subsequent phases, the seq's freshness can be believed. In addition, the formula (8) gives the MN the belief that it successfully shares Kbm with the MAP. Therefore, we can conclude that this phase is correct.
Intra-Handover Phase
The intra-handover phase is idealized into the following version:
In this form, the HMAC(K, M) is expressed as < M > K . Also, Kma is included as a nonce in (2-5) because it is newly generated by the MAP. Note that all messages except for the UNA message contain seq as a nonce.
The assumptions are given as follows:
Note that the four assumptions (A22, A23, A29, and A2a) are provided together because the Kbm plays two roles of both the shared secret and the encryption key. Also, the nAR can believe the Kma and its freshness since it safely receives the secret from the MAP through their secure channel. Thus, the assumptions (A26 and A27) are added.
Once we have the idealized form and the assumptions, we can verify this phase as follows:
Note that the nAR trusts the MN's attachment based on the formula (6). With such a trust, the nAR forwards the LBU message with the M7, leading to the formula (8) . Thus, the formula (8) makes the MAP confirms that the MN is present at the nAR's network. By the formulas (4), (7), and (8), we can know that the MAP has reasonable beliefs about the FBU and LBU messages. As a result, it can be concluded that this phase is valid.
Inter-Handover Phase
As mentioned above, the inter-handover phase is the same as the intra-handover one before the local binding update. Thus, we focus on the local binding update to verify this phase. The idealized version of this phase is as follows:
The assumptions are defined as follows:
From this point, we proceed to validate this phase.
Based on the formulas (1) and (2), the nMAP can trust the binding between the MN's nLCoA and nRCoA. Especially, the formula (1) enables the nMAP to guard against the DoS and redirect attacks. In addition, through the formula (5), the MN is sure that it successfully negotiates the Kbm with the nMAP. Consequently, we can conclude that this phase is correct.
Security Properties
(1) Secure key exchange: In ESS-FH, two keys Kbm and Kma are exchanged during the handover. When the MN executes the initialization phase or the interhandover one, it exchanges the Kbm with the new MAP based on the public key encryption. That is, the MAP encrypts the Kbm with the MN's public key PU MN , and then sends the encrypted value EKbm to the MN. In order to safely use the public key method, the MAP verifies the PU MN through the CGA method, which requires no third parties or additional infrastructure, such as a public-key infrastructure, to prove the address ownership [9] . Once the Kbm is negotiated, the MN uses it to efficiently exchange the Kma with the new AR whenever moving within the MAP domain. In this way, ESS-FH achieves secure key exchange based on both the public key encryption and the CGA method. Note that the AAA infrastructure can be used instead of the public key system [10] . However, compared to the AAA infrastructure, it enables handovers between MAPs, i.e., the inter-handover phase, to be more efficiently executed without the involvement of the AS . and M9 before performing the expensive operations. In this way, it can prevent this attack. On the other hand, ESS-FH uses the digital signature to protect the RtAdv message in the initialization phase. If the MN is not time-synchronized with the AR, it just believes that the AR once sent the RtAdv message to itself because of not being able to verify that the message is fresh. However, in order to exploit this vulnerability, the adversary should just replay the previous messages since it is so difficult to steal the AR's private key. That is, the adversary cannot freely forge the message. Moreover, the information given in the RtAdv message is seldom changed, and the initialization phase happens only during the MN's bootstrapping stage. Thus, such an attack is not effective. As a result, ESS-FH is not vulnerable to the DoS attack which Kang-Park's scheme suffers from.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, an analytical model is derived for evaluating ESS-FH compared to Kang-Park's scheme. Then, we present the numerical results where the handover latencies for both schemes are analyzed.
Analytical Model

Mobility Model
The Markov chain based probabilistic random walk mobility model is used as our mobility model. In this mobility model, the MN is assumed to be moving with a particular speed and in a particular direction for a given interval time [12] , [13] . Let p be the probability that the MN stays within the current MAP domain. Then, 1 − p is the probability that the MN moves to another MAP domain. The transition probability matrix for the movement probabilities is expressed as:
Let π 0 and π 1 be the long-term steady state probabilities that an MN stays in the current MAP domain and the MN moves to another, respectively. Then, π 0 and π 1 are expressed as:
where π 0 + π 1 = 1.
Handover Latency Model
The handover latency involving the authentication delay is one of the critical QoS metrics in mobile networks. More precisely, data packets sent to the MN will be lost or buffered during the handover. Note that FMIPv6 and FHMIPv6 which have buffering functionalities prevent the packet loss by applying a buffering technique at ARs. In this paper, the L2 handover latency is not considered because the L2 handover latency depends upon the used L2 technologies, e.g., IEEE 802.11 or IEEE 802. 16 . In MIPv6, the handover latency is defined as the sum of the movement detection delay, address configuration delay, and the registration delay [14] , whereas the movement detection delay and the address configuration delay are eliminated by adopting L2 information in FMIPv6 and F-HMIPv6. In this paper, the following three types of handover latency is modeled: the initial-handover latency for which the MN moves from its home work to a new MAP domain, the intra-handover latency for which the MN moves from the AR to another in the same MAP domain, and the inter-handover latency for which the MN moves from the MAP domain to another. The considered scenario is as follows: The MN boots up at its home network where the basic MIPv6 functions are supported. Then, it moves to the MAP domain and travels between different ARs in the same MAP domain. And the MN moves to another MAP domain. For clarity and convenience sake, we suppose that the cryptographic operation and queuing delays at nodes are negligible.
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Initial−HO denotes the initial-handover latency of Kang-Park's scheme. It is expressed as:
where
MD is the movement detection delay. As presented in [15] , the mean time between unsolicited RtAdv messages sent from the AR can be expressed as (MinInt + MaxInt)/2, where MinInt and MaxInt are the minimum and maximum times allowed between sending unsolicited RtAdv messages, respectively, as defined in [1] , [16] . D (KP) MD is thus expressed as the half of the mean time between unsolicited RtAdv messages:
In Eq. (4), D
AC is the address configuration delay. The MN on receiving the RtAdv message generates its address based on the prefix information included in the RtAdv message. Then, the MN performs the duplicate address detection (DAD) procedure as defined in [1] . Thus, if we assume that the address generation time at the MN is negligible, D
AC is expressed as:
where RetransT imer is the time between retransmissions of Neighbor Solicitation (NS) messages defined in [16] . DADT ransmits is the number of consecutive NS messages sent while performing DAD procedure as defined in [17] . (4) is the registration delay for binding updating to the HA and the MAP so that can be expressed as:
where D Suppose L
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Initial−HO denotes the initial-handover latency of proposed ESS-FH. Similar to Eq. (4), it is expressed as: (5) and (6) . In ESS-FH, the S K derivation from the AS depending on the AAA infrastructure which is being used in KangPark's scheme does not occur. Thus, D
Init−REG is expressed as: 
where 2t MN−AR is the delay for sending the UNA message and receiving the first data packet at the new AR.
Let L (ES S −FH)
Intra−HO denotes the intra-handover latency of proposed ESS-FH. It is expressed as:
In ESS-FH, the local binding update is executed by exchanging the LBU and LBA messages between the MN and the MAP after the MN moves to the nAR. However, as the nAR receives the UNA message sent from MN, the buffered data packets are immediately sent to the MN. Now, the inter-handover latency is analyzed. Let L
(PK)
Inter−HO denotes the inter-handover latency of Kang-Park's scheme, where the MN performs its inter-handover as the same of MIPv6 or HMIPv6. This is, the fast handover between the different MAP domains cannot be supported.
Thus, L (PK)
Inter−HO is expressed as:
(ES S −FH)
Inter−HO denotes the inter-handover latency of proposed ESS-FH. As described in Sect. 3.2.3, ESS-FH enables the fast handover between the different MAP domains when the MN performs its inter-handover. Thus, L
Numerical Results
For our numerical analysis, the following transmission de RetransT imer and DADT ransmits are set as 1000 ms and 1, respectively [15] . Figure 5 presents each type of handover latency. For both of Kang-Park's scheme and proposed ESS-FH, we first observe that when the MN performs its initial-handover to a new MAP domain managed by Kang-Park's scheme or proposed ESS-FH, the initial-handover latencies for them are the same. This is because that the MN moves from the network where the fast handover is not being supported so that neither of them can utilize L2 information for executing the fast handover. For the intra-handover latency, we can see that both of them achieve the reduced handover latency due to the effects of fast handover. The inter-handover latency of Kang-Park's scheme is much larger than that of ESS-FH. This is because that when the MN moves between the different MAP domains, the fast handover to the MN cannot be supported in Kang-Park's scheme.
The results presented in Fig. 5 provide the fact that ESS-FH outperforms Kang-Park's scheme in terms of the inter-handover latency. In order to investigate more details on the handover latency, we utilize the mobility model presented in Sect. 5.1.1. Then, the handover latency regarding movement probabilities can be expressed as:
where T is the average resident time of the MN at the MAP domain. Figure 6 shows the handover latency as a function of T . As we can see in Fig. 6 , ESS-FH always outperforms Kang-Park's scheme due to the effect of the fast handover when the MN performs its inter-handover between the different MAP domains. Accordingly, T is not a sensitive performance factor in ESS-FH, whereas Kang-Park's scheme is largely affected by T . Fig. 6 The handover latency as a function of T .
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed the Enhanced Security Scheme for Fast Handover in Hierarchical Mobile IPv6, called ESS-FH. ESS-FH makes use of the CGA method and the public key cryptography to provide the strong key exchange as well as the key independence. At the same time, it defends against the DoS and redirection attacks, which Kang-Park's scheme suffers from. Moreover, ESS-FH achieves the fast handover even mobile nodes perform the inter-handover between different Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 domains. In order to show its superiority, we performed formal security analysis as well as performance evaluation. According to the results, it is shown that ESS-FH achieves both strong security and good efficiency.
